On 14 May, Turks will decide whether or not to approve – in final terms – Erdoğan’s drive toward an extremely centralised system of government, or, to put it more simply, one-man rule, writes Yavuz Baydar.
Yavuz Baydar is a senior journalist and analyst in Turkish and international media. He was formerly the editor-in-chief of Ahval News and served as Turkey’s first independent news ombudsman between 1999-2013.
With President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan setting voting day for 14 May, Turkey’s polarised political landscape is braced for the most critical, dramatic elections in the country’s history. Coinciding with the republic’s centennial, the choice of nearly 53 million voters feels existential: They will decide whether or not to approve – in final terms – Erdoğan’s drive toward an extremely centralised system of government, or, to put it more simply, one-man rule.
The presidential and parliamentary elections must be seen as a decision on the nature of how the country is administered. The fragmented opposition camp’s immense challenges appear to work in favour of Erdoğan and his ruling alliance. The chances are that despite Turkey being entombed in a deep economic crisis, he may well win again.
The elections are essentially a referendum about ending or maintaining a one-party rule, which has lasted for two decades. Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have won consecutively 13 elections and three referendums in that period, cementing a sense of invincibility.
This paved the way for a slow-motion power grab in which Erdoğan seized control of key state institutions, subordinated the judiciary and media to the executive and spread a blend of Islamism and offensive nationalism within society. Inevitably during such a long stay in power, top-level corruption and nepotism have become entrenched.
In the last 10 years, more power has been concentrated with Erdoğan himself, and as a result, the cracks in the ground upon which Turkey’s fragile system is built have grown deeper. The state, critics argue, has become dysfunctional, turning the country into a ship adrift in a storm after storm, minimising the president’s decision-making to firefighting.
But, his way of ruling has given birth to a corrupt oligarchy and, by way of the massive amount of people employed within the state apparatus, a loyal segment of voters who see the upcoming elections as a fight to preserve their privileges.
Once more, Erdoğan is resolved to mobilise them for what he sees as the final battle to eternalise his power. Over time he has shown his skill for brinkmanship to defeat enemies and to change his political colours by forming new alliances. He remains a formidable foe for his adversaries, ready to resort to any means necessary to survive.
Time has also shown that those negotiating with him, domestic or foreign, often fail by underestimating his abilities. Despite growing dismay on the international stage, he has shown that appeasement works in his favour.
In various ways, the task before the Turkish opposition to defeat him is arduous. The first issue is the safety of the elections.
Erdoğan controls two key departments through his loyal ministers. Providing security will be his controversial Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, who reigns over hundreds of thousands of partisan police. Bekir Bozdag, the justice minister, will stand ready to help his boss and intervene in the legal process when necessary. Regional governors are also equipped with massive powers to restrict opposition rallies.
Two more key institutions stand in the way of the opposition. First is the Supreme Council of Radio and Television, which is meant to act as a media watchdog but will be intent on keeping a tight grip on opposition news outlets. (About 90 per cent of Turkish media is already under Erdoğan’s control.) And then there is the Supreme Electoral Council, which during Erdoğan’s rule has lost its autonomy by appointing loyal judges.
The council has become part of the AKP-controlled state, yet it will have the final word on whether or not Erdoğan’s candidacy to serve as president for a third term is constitutional. The opposition claims he can only do two terms.
The council also has the power to uphold or reject the nomination lists of the politicians. It can arbitrarily strike off names, especially from the lists of pro-Kurdish candidates from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), citing classified documents of the state. Its rulings can not be appealed.
Undoubtedly, the economic crisis, which has led to real inflation of about 150%, has spread “Erdoğan fatigue” beyond the traditional opposition. Based on a few reliable pollsters, it is fair to assume that the anti-Erdoğan wave has a potential of 55-60% of the vote.
But the main adversary of the opposition is the opposition itself. A blend of centrist and conservative parties – the so-called “table of six” – has shied away from approaching the pro-Kurdish HDP, whose solid voter base has more than 12% of the vote.
It is impossible for the opposition to defeat Erdoğan without the HDP. The uncertainty shows that the unresolved Kurdish issue will continue to haunt Turkey in its centennial. Fully aware of the anti-Kurdish sentiment, Erdoğan plays the nationalism card to drive wedges into the fragmented opposition.
Key to understanding these elections is that who will be elected president is far more important than the composition of the parliament, given the vast powers now concentrated within the presidency. If no presidential candidate receives more than 50% of the vote on 14 May, then there will be another round two weeks later between the two leading hopefuls.
Erdoğan is banking on the expectation that if his party wins the parliamentary election by a considerable margin, voters will also give him a third term. The only difference this time may be that Erdoğan will take the result as a carte blanche for a lifetime presidency. He has all the tools he needs.
